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estoppel. But since, in the principal case, as the court points out, the
plaintiff was not a passenger in the defendant's cab, he could not be
said to have in any way relied upon an apparent agency. Even where
reliance has been established it must be further shown to find an estoppel
that reliance 'induced the parties to have the collision.' Keeling v. Nall,
sutra. Contra, Middleton v. Frances, 257 Ky. 42, 77 S.W. (2d) 425
(1934).
Since no estoppel is to be found in the principal case, the plaintiff
must recover, if at all, upon the basis of the employment relationship
existing between the driver and the owner of the cab. In view of the
above authorities it would appear that as a matter of law no master-
servant relationship existed and the court was correct in dismissing the
petition.
JUSTIN J. GRIBBELL
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION- GOING AND COMING RULE -
ATTENDING CONVENTION
The general phrase "in the course of the employment," found in
the Ohio Constitution, Art. II, sec. 35 and the Ohio Gen. Code, sec.
I4 65 -68 in connection with compensable injuries, has been construed
in two recent Ohio decisions, which present extremes in their respective
fact situations.
The Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. owns a property in the city of
Akron on the south side of East Market St. extending adjacently to the
sidewalk for approximately 2500 feet. On this street the company
maintains an entrance gate for employees and 300 to 400 feet east of
it on the same side of the street an "East Gate" used only by tractors
for loading and unloading purposes. The plaintiff, an employee of the
company, had the option of taking several routes to work. While cross-
ing on the sidewalk in front of the "East Gate," he was struck by a
tractor of the company, coming out of the gate, driven by a company
employee. The plaintiff recovered in a common law action for dam-
ages. This was affirmed on appeal by the company, the court refusing
to hold that the injury occurred in the course of the employment on the
following grounds: (I) it was not a necessary incident of plaintiff's
employment that he use said sidewalk; (2) the sidewalk, a part of a
public street, was not in the zone of control of the company; (3) he
suffered hazards common to the public; and (4) plaintiff had not
reached the place where he could enter the defendant's premises to
perform his duties. Fike v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 56 Ohio
App. 197, 23 Ohio Abs. 480, 9 Ohio Op. 312 (1937).
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In the second case it appears that one, Sawyer, was the president
and sales manager of a chick hatchery company in Ohio, which was a
member of the International Baby Chick Association. The hatchery
company was represented in the association by Sawyer, who became the
president and a member of the board of the association. While attending
a meeting of the board at the association's convention at Milwaukee,
Wisconsin, Sawyer was shot and killed by another member of the board
whose employer had been punished for violating the association's code
of ethics. The court of appeals held the death to be compensable for
the reasons: (i) that such injury and death occurred in the course of
his employment by such hatchery company; and (2) that such death
arose out of his employment. Bersche v. Industrial Comm., 56 Ohio
App. 236, 24 Ohio Abs. 549, 9 Ohio Op. 325 (1937).
The Ohio Gen. Code, sec. 1465-68, provides as follows: "Every
employee . . . who is injured, and the dependents of such as are killed
in the course of employment, wheresoever such injury has occurred . . .
shall be paid such compensation out of the general insurance fund." The
courts have construed this section liberally. Industrial Comm. v. Lewis,
125 Ohio St. 296, 18i N.E. 136 (1932); Industrial Comm. v. Wei-
gandt, 102 Ohio St. I, 13o N.E. 38 (1921). The test of the right
to compensation award is whether the employment had some causal
connection with the injury, either through its activities, its conditions, or
its environments. Industrial Comm. v. Weigandt, supra; Grabler Mfg.
Co. v. Wrobel, 125 Ohio St. 265, 181 N.E. 97 (1932)-
The first principal case referred to, Fike v. Goodyear Tire and Rub-
ber Co., supra, involves the so-called "Going and Coming Rule" which
applies particularly to that contract of hire which contemplates that the
workman render service at a designated place. Campbell, Workmen's
Compensation, sec. 163. Thus, as a general rule, employees injured
while going to and coming from work have not been regarded as being
injured in the course of their employment. Industrial Comm. v. Baker,
127 Ohio St. 345, 188 N.E. 56o (1933); Conrad v. Coal Co., 107
Ohio St. 387, 14o N.E. 482 (1923); Industrial Comm. v. Heil, 123
Ohio St. 604, 176 N.E. 458 (1931); Industrial Comm. v. Gintert,
128 Ohio St. 129, 19o N.E. 400, 92 A.L.R. 1032 (1934); Bowers
v. Industrial Comm. 24 N.P. (N.S.) 56 (1921); McKenzie v. Indus-
trial Comm., 24 Ohio App. 455, 155 N.E. 704 (1926). But, it can-
not be laid down as a universal and invariable rule that the hazards of
the employment begin in all instances at the point where the employee
crosses the line of the employer's premises. 42 Ohio Jur., sec. 54- In-
juries received by workmen while crossing railroad tracks on the public
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street or highway while going to or from work have been held com-
pensable as injuries sustained in the course of the employment. Indus-
trial Comm. v. Henry, 124 Ohio St. 616, i8o N.E. 194 (1932);
Cudahy Packing Co. v. Parramore, 263 U.S. 418, 44 Sup. Ct. 153
(1923); Bountiful Brick Co. v. Industrial Comm. of Utah, 68 Utah
6oo, 251 Pac. 555 (1926). The "Going and Coming Rule" has no
application where the employee is injured while passing, with the express
or implied consent of the employer, over the premises of another in such
proximity to the employer's place as to be in practical effect a part of
the employer's premises. Campbell, Workmen's Compensation, sec.
170; Bountiful Brick Co. v. Giles, 276 U.S. 154, 48 Sup. Ct. 221
(1928); Simonson v. Knight, 174 Minn. 491, 219 N.W. 869
(1928); Stacy's Case, 225 Mass. 174, 114 N.E. 2o6 (i916).
The Ohio Supreme Court has held an injury received on a dead
end street 20 or 40 feet from the entrance gate of the company to be
compensable on the grounds: (i) although a public street, it was actu-
ally under the control of the employer; (2) it was the only unobstructed
access to the premises; (3) the pursuance of such course was an implied
obligation of the employee in his contract with such employer, and
(4) the hazards of such zone growing out of conditions and environ-
ments of his employment are hazards of his employment. Industrial
Comm. v. Barber, 117 Ohio St. 373, 159 N.E. 363 (1927).
An injury to an employee who slipped on the sidewalk of a public
street a few feet from the entrance of the employer's business place has
been held compensable as sustained within the scope of the employment
on the theory that the sidewalk is not only a necessary adjunct and used
in connection with the business but it is, also, to a limited degree and
purpose a part of the defendant's premises. Barnett v. Britling Cafeteria
Co., 225 Ala. 462, 143 So. 813 (932).
Thus, "employment" may begin in point of time before the work
is entered upon and in point of space before the place is reached where
the work is to be done and continue for a like time and space. Campbell,
Workmen's Compensation, sec. 170.
The fact that the plaintiff in Fike v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber
Co., supra, was injured on that part of the sidewalk used by the company
tractors as a drive way for loading and unloading materials indicates
that the court might readily have regarded the place of injury as coming
within the zone of employment on the theory of the Barnett case, supra,
that such part of the sidewalk is a necessary adjunct to the employer's
business and to a limited degree and purpose a part of the company's
premises under the control of the company. But to have done so, the
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court would have denied the plaintiff, employee, his common-law recov-
ery. It is a question, whether the court would have reached the same
decision had this been a case in which the plaintiff had sued for compen-
sation. In other words, would the court apply different tests for common
law actions and actions for compensation?
Turning to the case of Bersohe v. Industrial Comm., supra, it
should be noted that injuries received by an employee while voluntarily
engaged in some activity having no essential relation to or connection
with the employment, and undertaken solely for the pleasure, conveni-
ence, or benefit of himself or third persons, are not compensable as
arising out of or in the course of the employment. Industrial Comm. v.
.4hern, ii9 Ohio St. 41, 162 N.E. 272, 59 A.L.R. 367 (1928);
Industrial Comm. v. Lewis, supra. But, if the employee is sent on a
special errand either as a part of his regular duties or at the request of
the employer, an injury received while on that errand is compensable.
Campbell, Workmen's Compensation, sec. 182; Fronce v. Prosperity
Co., 255 N.Y. 613, 175 N.E. 336 (931). The fact that the em-
ployee is making the journey on his employer's business is sufficient to
bring him within the protection of the act. Industrial Comm. v. Dense,
14 Ohio App. 224, 32 Ohio C. A. 552 (1920); Industrial Comm. v.
Wilson, 34 Ohio App. 36, 17o N.E. 37 (1929); Western & S. F.
Ins. Co. v. Kennett, 15 Ohio L. Abs. 357 (1933).
This is illustrated by Industrial Comm. v. Davison, 18 Ohio St.
185, 6 Ohio L. Abs. 188 (1928). There it appeared that one Davison,
dean of the department of education, at Ohio Northern University,
with the consent of the University lectured to the graduating classes of
the various high schools. During the lecture tours, he was paid by both
the university and the high schools at which he would lecture. While
lecturing to a high school graduating group, he received an injury which
resulted in his death. The Supreme Court of Ohio held his injury and
death to be compensable on the ground that it was sustained in the course
of and arose out of the scope of his employment. The court stressed the
fact that the additional employment made him no less the employee of
the university and that he, with the consent of the university, was
lecturing fo rthe benefit of the university. The relationship of Dr.
Davison to the university on the occasion of those trips was not different
from that relationship which exists between a manufacturer or jobber
and his traveling salesman. Industrial Comm. v. Davison, supra. The
court in the Bersche case cites the Davison case and says that it is in
principle, exactly in point.
It's an established rule that the provisions of the Ohio Gen. Code,
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Sec. 1465-68, do not cover an injury which has its cause entirely outside
of and disconnected from the business in which the injured workman is
employed. Fassig v. State, 95 Ohio St. 232, In6 N.E. 104 (1917);
Slanina v. Industrial Comm., i17 Ohio St. 329, i58 N.E. 829
(1927). But, if the injuries are sustained neither on the premises
nor within its immediate environs, the employee acting within the scope
of his employment, must, at the time of his injury, have been engaged
in the promotion of his employer's business and in furtherance of his
affairs. Industrial Comm. v. Bateman, 126 Ohio St. 279, 185 N.E. 50
(1933). The injury need not be an anticipated one, nor peculiar to
the employment, but after the event it must appear to have had its
origin in a risk connected with the employment and to have followed
from that cause as a rational consequence. Industrial Comm. v. Pora,
ioo Ohio St. 218, 125 N.E. 662 (I919); Delassandro v. Industrial
Comm., iio Ohio St. 5o6, 144 N.E. 138'(1924).
The courts generally hold that if an assault upon an employee be
committed by another solely to gratify personal ill-will, anger, or hatred,
injury does not arise out of the employment within the meaning of the
statute. Harris v. Sloss-Sheffield S. & I. Co., 222 Ala. 470, 132 So.
727 (1931); January-Wood Co. v. Schumaker, 231 Ky. 705, Z2
S.W. (2nd) 117 (1929). The rule under these circumstances is the
same whether the assailant be a fellow employee or a stranger. January-
Vood Co. v. Schumaker, supra; Harden v. Furniture Co., 199 N.C.
733, 155 S.E. 728 (1930); Spring Canyon Cr. Co. v. Industrial
Comm., 58 Utah 6o8, 201 Pac. 173 (192i). However, where the
assaulted employee is not the aggressor and no prior or personal quarrel
exists between the parties and the quarrel does not arise out of any cir-
cumstances extraneous to the employment in which they are engaged at
the time, although both may be of equal rank, the injury is compensable.
.ltolia Min. Co. v. Industrial .cc. Comm., 175 Cal. 691, 167 Pac.
148 (1917). It is immaterial whether the employees work for the
same or different employers. The same tests apply for compensability.
Campbell, Workmen's Compensation, sec. 157; Whittington v. Aetna
etc. Co., 12 Cal. I.A.C. 388 (1925).
In the light of the preceding discussion, it appears that the court in
the Bersche case rendered the proper conclusion. However, it is sub-
mitted that the court in the Fike case, on the theory stated, should have
denied the plaintiff his common law remedy and required him to apply
for compensation.
WILLIAM T. CREME
